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Confucian Democracy as Pragmatic
Experiment: Uniting Love of Learning
and Love of Antiquity
Sor-Hoon Tan
This paper argues for the pragmatic construction of Confucian democracy by showing
that Chinese philosophers who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive
dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically,
otherwise their love of the past is at the expense of something else Confucius held in equal
esteem, love of learning. Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do
well to learn from the earlier failures of the iconoclastic Westernizers, and realize that a
Chinese democracy cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part
of China’s history, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China lie
in transforming that tradition without destroying it. Eagerness to learn from others
must be united with a proper appreciation of one’s own past to nurture democracy as a
way of life.
For Chinese intellectuals of the early twentieth century, who were pursuing ‘science’
and ‘democracy’ to save China from its internal chaos and external threats,
Confucianism was the arch-enemy. Their advocacy of a ‘new culture’ was often
iconoclastic, and Confucians’ ‘love of antiquity’ epitomized for them the stifling
traditionalism that had weakened China over the centuries.1 Confucian Democracy:
A Deweyan Reconstruction (Tan, 2004b) argues that John Dewey’s Pragmatism and
Confucianism show an affinity in their understanding of the individual, of
community, of equality, authority and freedom, so that a Dewey inspired
Pragmatist reconstruction of Confucianism offers us a philosophical basis for
Confucian democracy, contrary to the anti-democratic historical practices in China
that have passed for Confucianism in the past.
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This paper takes up the engagement between Dewey’s Pragmatism and
Confucianism from yet a different angle. Given the rich variety, some would say
chaotic fragmentation, of current intellectual discourses in China, specifically in the
field of Chinese philosophy, why would Confucian democracy of a Pragmatist kind
appeal either to those who wish to ‘revive’ Confucian traditions or to those who
desire democracy for China? I shall argue that Chinese philosophers who wish to see
Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to
approach it pragmatically and democratically, otherwise their love of the past is at the
expense of something else Confucius held in equal esteem, the love of learning.
Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do well to learn from
the earlier failures of iconoclastic Westernizers, and realize that a Chinese democracy
cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part of China’s
history and culture, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China
lie in creatively transforming that tradition without destroying it, and in learning
judiciously from other traditions. Eagerness to learn from others must be united with
a proper appreciation of one’s own past to nurture democracy as a way of life.
China’s Democratic Quest: Past Failures and Future Prospects
For nearly two millennia, rulers in China claimed their mandate from heaven; but
since the first popular election (1912–1913) of a national government involving only
about one eighth of the population, Chinese governments have claimed popular
mandate. Yet a government of the people, by the people, for the people remains a
dream. China’s quest for democracy has been a frustrating tale of broken promises
and unfulfilled hope. Within a few years of the establishment of the first Chinese
Republic, two attempts were made to restore the monarchy, both involving
Confucian conservatives who wanted Confucianism made the State religion. A highly
unstable government lurched from crisis to crisis in a country torn by power
struggles among war lords and threatened by the imperialistic ambitions of Japan.
The May Fourth Movement notwithstanding, democratic participation was mean-
ingless to the vast majority of Chinese people struggling for their very survival.
During the Nanjing decade (1928–1938), the Guomindang, under Chiang Kaishek
implemented ‘tutelary government’ (xunzheng ); intended by Sun Yat-sen as a
transitional stage of one-party rule that prepares the population for democracy,
Chiang’s application of the doctrine was close to Fascism and failed to usher in
democracy.2 The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) victory was secured with an
impressive popular mobilization; but Mao Tse-tung’s promise of a ‘New Democracy’
brought nothing more than a Leninist ‘democratic centralism’ that is but another
name for totalitarian Communist Party dictatorship.
Reforms under Deng Xiaoping revived hopes for democracy in China. The
intellectual ferment of the eighties harks back to the ‘Chinese Enlightenment’ of the
May Fourth period (Li Zehou, 1999, p. 859; Xu Jilin, 1999, p. 257; Yan Jiaqi, 1990,
pp. 29–36). Just as the May Fourth promoters of new culture were convinced that a
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cultural transformation was required to save China, the very influential television
miniseries The River Elegy, the centre-piece of the ‘culture craze’ (wenhua re )
in China which has retrospectively been dubbed the ‘new Enlightenment’, adopted
the same iconoclastic stance towards Chinese traditional culture, despite the import
of a New Confucianism arguing for the compatibility of Confucianism and
democracy (Su, 1992, pp. 353–423; Xu Jilin, 1999, pp. 8–9, 250–262).3 The May
Fourth Movement provided the symbols and tactics for democracy movements of the
eighties. The May Fourth slogans, ‘Science’ and ‘Democracy’, appeared on T-shirts in
the 1989 demonstrations. However, hopes that reforms would usher in a Chinese
democracy any time soon was shaken by the repressive reactions against
the Democracy Wall Movement, and then most cruelly dashed when the 1989
Democracy Movement ended in a blood bath around Tiananmen Square, as the
People’s Liberation Army turned its weapons against the Chinese people.
The CCP survived the world’s condemnation of its brutal crushing of the 1989
Democracy Movement. The tenacity of CCP’s authoritarian rule notwithstanding,
many in and outside China remain convinced that democracy represents the end of
history and China can be no exception. However, they disagree over the timing of
such transition. Some predict a democracy in China as early as 2010 (Chang, 2001;
Starr, 2001). Others expect a successful democratic transition by 2020 (Gilley, 2004,
p. 98; Hu Shaohua, 2000, p. 160, fn. 48; Xu Xing, 2002). More cautious
commentators place the event some time in the unspecified or distant future
(Diamond & Myers, 2000, p. 12; Scalapino, 1998, p. 35; Winckler, 1999, pp. 3–48).
The first two groups are probably too optimistic. According to one commentator,
‘the democracy movement’s moral crusade has been reduced within China to a
whisper’ within a few years and, frequent localized popular protests notwithstanding,
no nation-wide movement demanding democracy comparable to that in 1989 has
materialized (Benewick, 1995, p. 6).4 Even the tenth anniversary of the Democracy
Movement, for all the anxieties that marked the year 1999, passed without any
significant interruptions to the official celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The recent death of Zhao Ziyang,
a symbol of the hopes and defeat of 1989, no doubt causing the CCP leadership some
sleepless nights, passed without any major political upheaval. While many Chinese
interviewed by international media acknowledged Zhao as a good leader, when the
1989 Democracy Movement was mentioned, quite a few young Chinese judged those
involved as being ‘too idealistic’.
Some surveys conducted in the nineties show that, compared with other democratic
countries, the mass political culture in the PRC appears sufficient to sustain
democracy. However, many believe that ‘it is China’s elites who will play a crucial role
in whether political change takes place in the near future’ (Shi Tianjian, 2001, p. 194).
Notwithstanding the presence of cultural prerequisites for democracy, among China’s
elites, there seems to be ‘disenchantment with democracy’. The Chinese intellectual
scene of the nineties saw the socially engaged, actively pro-democracy humanism of
the eighties replaced by a spiritual and moral humanism that focuses on personal
integrity. The concern with ‘academic norms’ appears to some as a retreat into
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professional elitism irrelevant to the ordinary people’s everyday life and neglecting the
democratic responsibility of rational discourse (Xu, 1999, pp. 49–56).5 Some feel that
it is hubris to believe that intellectuals have a mission to ‘save China’. Others
bemoaned that intellectuals seem to have lost their ‘public character’. A ‘collective
escapism’ prevails among many intellectuals (He Yi, 1995; Liu Xiaofeng, 1991, pp. 2–3;
Xu Jilin, 1999, pp. 14–18). This political withdrawal in response to the failed bid for
democracy and authoritarian reassertion of CCP rule is further reinforced by a turn to
professionalism in the ‘new national studies’ (xin guoxue ). Academics and
experts increasingly replace intellectuals, who have become marginalized not only
economically and politically, but also socially (Xu, 1999, pp. 74–80; Chen Xiaoming,
1997, p. 38; Wang Hui, 2001, p. 162; Xu Jilin, 1999, p. 12).
The important differences underlying the common platform of attitudes and
approaches of the 1980s, which viewed China’s problems mostly in terms of a
tradition-modernity contrast, with the West providing the model for China’s
modernization, surfaced as major intellectual divisions in the 1990s (Xu Jilin, 1999,
pp. 257–262). Deeper knowledge of the ideas and theories accepted during the
eighties as well as new ideas and theories provided multiple perspectives on the
increasingly complex problems of reforms. Support for democracy became more
qualified as debates arose over the relative merits of radicalism and conservatism, the
meaning and relevance of liberalism, and the malaise of modernity. The meaning of
democracy has become more explicitly contested rather than merely taken for
granted. Post-Tiananmen Chinese discourses are very much concerned with stability
and finding a ‘third way’ for China’s modernization between capitalism and
Marxism-Leninism. Among those who still believe that democracy should have a
place in China’s future, fewer take for granted that Chinese democracy must be a
form of liberal democracy similar to existing Western democratic polities. Many
believe that learning from the West must be combined with an appreciation of
China’s unique situation. This unique situation includes China’s cultural and
philosophical traditions, among which Confucianism is arguably the most important.
Recovering Tradition: Will It Obstruct Democratization?
What role does Confucianism play in discussions about democracy and China’s
future? May Fourth intellectuals thought that demolishing Confucianism and
transforming China’s culture will bring about democracy. One might then conclude
that the lack of democracy in China is due to Chinese culture remaining Confucian.6
Should those who want democracy work harder to eradicate Confucianism? Those
who believe Confucianism has been dealt a severe if not a death blow without
democracy materializing in China may insist that Confucianism was not the only
obstacle to democracy in China, and many prerequisites, cultural or otherwise, for
democracy remain missing or inadequate. Still, inheritors of May Fourth’s
anti-Confucian attitudes will see any revival of Confucianism as bad news
for democratization. This view is not uncommon given the long association between
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autocratic government and Confucian state orthodoxy in imperial China.
Furthermore, attempts to obstruct or destroy whatever little democratic gains
China had seen in the last century have often solicited the help of Confucianism:
from attempts to restore the monarchy in the early Chinese Republic to Chiang
Kaishek’s mixing of Fascism with Confucianism in his one-party rule (Wakeman,
1997), to the recent CCP leaders’ promotion of Confucianism as a bulwark against
Western values of liberal democracy.
May Fourth attitudes to Confucianism had influenced a whole generation of
Chinese, including Mao Tse-tung. In an attack on Liang Shuming, whom Guy Alitto
called ‘the last Confucian’, Mao criticized Confucius for being ‘undemocratic’
(Ma Zhenduo, Xu Yuanhe, & Zheng Jiadong, 1999, p. 363). During the Cultural
Revolution, Confucianism was identified with feudal society and vehemently
attacked. With the ‘liberation of thought’ brought by Deng’s reforms, calls for re-
evaluation of Confucianism, beginning with an article in the Guangming Daily (Pang
Pu, 1978, p. 2), came from different quarters with increasing frequency. By the mid-
eighties, the study of Confucianism shifted from re-evaluation to democratic
reconstruction (Song Xianlin, 2003, p. 85; Song Zhongfu, 1991, p. 356). There was
renewed interest in the works of twentieth-century Chinese philosophers who have
asserted the centrality of Confucianism in Chinese traditional culture, some of whom
have attempted democratic reinterpretation or reconstruction of Confucian tradition
and culture in their encounter with Western democratic thought (Chang, Mou
Zongsan, Tang Junyi, & Xu Fuguan, 1958; Tu Wei-ming, 1986, pp. 3–21). Scholars of
Confucianism who advocated the compatibility of Confucianism and liberal
democracy, such as Tu Wei-ming, were invited to China on lecture tours. Not all
Chinese participants in the 1980s Confucian discourse welcomed the revival of
Confucianism. Many continue to see Confucianism as a tradition that is obsolete, an
obstacle to modernization, particularly to democratization (Bao Zunxing, 1988a,
p. 64; 1988b; Gan Yang, 1986; Gao Xuguang, 1988; Liu Xiaobo, 1988, pp. 89–90; Zhu
Riyao, Cao Deben, & Sun Xiaochun, 1987, p. 16). The revival of Confucianism in the
PRC and resistance to it were different responses to the perceived dilemma of
learning from the West and preserving ‘Chinese culture’, brought by the Open Door
policies of the reform era, which resulted in the ‘culture craze’ of the 1980s.
According to Song Xianlin’s recent study, ‘the newly created ‘‘Confucian discourse’’
helped to reconstruct and re-imagine the Confucian ideal in post-Mao Chinese
society, later serving as a catalyst for the ‘‘national studies craze’’ (guoxue re )
of the 1990s’ (2003, p. 81).
Reflecting on the 1989 Democracy Movement, some intellectuals associated with
the journal Xueren (The Scholar) found that the New Enlightenment intellectuals,
who exercised great influence on the participants of the movement, knew or cared
very little about Chinese history (Wang Hui, 2003, pp. 59–60). The resulting
emphasis on China’s historical context and its relation with current Chinese realities,
and the importance of both for charting China’s future, gives rise to a new interest
in pre-twentieth century Chinese literature, history and philosophy—subjects
grouped together as guoxue (national studies). A broad range of intellectuals,
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neo-conservatives, neo-nationalists, but also new left intellectuals and postmoder-
nists, share this new interest in Chinese traditions. Even liberals, who usually
criticized traditional culture for lacking science and democracy, started arguing that a
Chinese philosophy ‘purified’ by the encounter with the West is highly compatible
with the latest scientific paradigms, and that a nation that fails to find the roots of
modernization in its own cultural traditions cannot modernize successfully
(Li Shenzhi, 1992). The ‘national studies craze’ is more than an academic interest
in the past. Following Sheng Hong’s (1993) attempt to find parallels between pre-Qin
Chinese thought and Western economic thought, including private property and the
role of institutions, a steady stream of articles appeared in various journals exploring
the relation between Confucianism and contemporary economics, management,
environmental issues, sports, education, even law enforcement.7 Besides the relevance
of Confucian ideas to specific areas or practice, its general compatibility with
modernization and democracy also received considerable attention.8 An interest in
traditional culture and thought need not be conservative or anti-democratic and a
more balanced approach to East–West comparison could be more productive than
one based on a romanticized view of the West.
The danger of this renewed interest in tradition lies in going to the other extreme
of romanticizing traditional Chinese culture itself and refusing to acknowledge that
there are valuable things to be learned from other cultures. Some scholars who have
long devoted themselves to the study of Chinese traditional culture worry about
‘national studies’ being appropriated as an ideology and falling into narrow
nationalism; they insist that the only way for Chinese culture to flourish again is for
the ‘true spirit’ of Chinese culture to connect with contemporary demands, and with
the developing trends of world culture (Tang Yijie, 1995). However, given the
tendency to conceive Chinese and Western cultures as antitheses, critics have good
reason to associate the interest in ‘national studies’ with unhealthy anti-Western
nationalism and conservative political outlook (Chen Xiaoming, 1997, p. 36).
The ‘return to traditional culture’, linked to the rise of neoconservatism-
neoauthoritarianism in China, is part of a wave of ‘Asian exceptionalism’ in the
1990s. In the 1980s, the impressive economic achievement of the four ‘little dragons’
in Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—generated a discussion
about a possible Asian model of development, suggesting that their common
Confucian culture was largely responsible for the economic success of these countries
(Berger & Hsiao, 1988; Kahn, 1979, pp. 121–123, 329–383).9 China and other
countries in and out of Asia turned to Asian models, as alternatives or complements
to Western models, in search of development strategies that would avoid the
problems in the West and preserve the best of their own cultural traditions (Bell,
1995, p. 34).10 Arguments about the differences between Asian values and Western
values have been deployed against ideas such as democracy, individual autonomy,
and human rights—or at least against the hegemony of Western conceptions of these
ideas.11 Some Western scholars join Asian officials and academics in resisting
imposition of Western standards as universal norms. Others take a more moderate
position and argue that greater political participation and freedom of expression in
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undemocratic illiberal Asian societies would depend in part on ‘agreement that
human rights should not be understood or defined solely in Western terms; rather,
they are a growing, expandable concept that will be enhanced through shared
multicultural learning and experience’, while Asian scholars such as Onuma Yasuaki
(1996) called for ‘intercivilizational’ human rights (see also de Bary, 1998, p. 54;
Li Tieying, 2001).
To what extent could democracy and other related ideas of liberty, equality, or
rights be generated from Chinese culture? Are they even compatible? Lucian Pye
considers Confucian political culture authoritarian and an obstacle to the
democratization in Asia (1985, pp. 55–89). Samuel Huntington goes so far as to
call Confucian democracy ‘a contradiction in terms’ (1996, p. 21). On this reading,
Confucian societies, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, succeeded in their
democratization despite Confucianism; in becoming democratic, they become less
Confucian. In contrast, Wm. Theodore de Bary (1983) and Tu Wei-ming (1986)
interpret Confucian philosophy as humanistic and liberal. Tu (1984, p. 90) and
Yu Ying-shih (1997, p. 208) defend the Confucian way of life while rejecting its
political baggage. Between the extremes of interpreting Confucianism as a humanism
with liberal democratic tendencies and insisting that Confucianism is feudal and
inherently authoritarian, Hu Shaohua recently argues that Confucianism is neither
democratic in itself nor an insurmountable obstacle to democratization
(2000, pp. 23–26).
Some comparisons of Confucian values with democratic values emphasize their
significant differences. Liu Shu-hsien (1992) insists that Confucianism must
surrender some components and radically transform others to accommodate
democracy. There are also scholars who maintain that the values of Confucianism
and liberal democracy are inherently incompatible. On this basis, Chenyang Li (1999,
chap. 7) argues for coexistence of both set of values in China’s future, while Henry
Rosemont (1998) uses these differences to criticize Western liberal democracy. Those
who reject Confucian democracy usually adopt the liberal conception of democracy
and interpret Confucianism as inherently collectivistic, patriarchal, and authoritar-
ian. However, democracy is a contested concept in Western philosophical discourses,
just as Confucianism is not a homogeneous tradition. Those who believe that
Confucianism has no place for liberal individual autonomy may nevertheless see
Confucianism as compatible with a democracy that adopts a social conception of the
individual, such as that found in John Dewey’s philosophy. Roger Ames and David
Hall have argued that Dewey’s ‘communitarian’ conception of democracy is the best
bridge between China’s Confucian civilization and a democratic future (Hall & Ames,
1999). I agree with them regarding the appeal of Deweyan democracy for Confucians
in this regard, although as a Deweyan Pragmatist, I would resist any dualistic divide
between liberalism and communitarianism.
There is no end in sight to the debates about the compatibility of Confucianism
and democracy. As long as China does not democratize, its Confucian legacy will
always be suspected of being one of the obstacles if not the primary obstacle. No
doubt if the PRC becomes a democracy, people will argue over whether it is still
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Confucian, and whether Confucianism enhances or detracts from the resulting
Chinese democracy. For those who are interested in China becoming democratic but
remaining Confucian in some ways, it is vital to persuade those with a stake and who
could do something about China’s future that Confucianism in the new millennium
can and should be democratic. In the rest of this paper, I extend the argument for
Confucian democracy by showing that it may be seen as a pragmatic experiment that
unites Confucian love of learning with Confucian love of antiquity. In the remaining
sections, I shall present passages from the Analects that illustrate the importance of
both love of learning and love of antiquity, with the former relatively more important
than the latter, and then proceed to show, through what may be called a creatively
transformative reading of relevant passages in the text, how a pragmatic democracy is
well suited to unite these twin loves in the Analects.
Twin Loves in the Analects: Haoxue and Haogu
It is widely recognized that Confucian societies value education very highly. To the
Chinese, Confucius is the ‘model teacher of ten thousand generations’ (wanshi
shibiao ). The Analects begins with a passage about the delight of practicing
what one has learned, and the topic of learning continues throughout the text. The
text itself is not only a record of what Confucius’ students had learned from him, but
also contains Confucian views about the nature and the importance of learning.
Learning has more than instrumental value, it is a goal in life that merits
commitment and love. Confucius described the key stages of his life by beginning
with his ‘setting his heart-mind upon learning from fifteen’.12 He urged his students
to ‘make an earnest commitment to the love of learning (haoxue) and be steadfast to
the death in service to the efficacious way (shandao )’ (Analects 8.13). A ‘refined’
or ‘cultured’ person, one who may be described as wena ( ), is a person who loves
learning (Analects 5.5). The love of learning also characterizes the exemplary person
(Analects 1.14).
Among the reasons Yan Hui stood out among Confucius’ students is his true love
of learning, which Confucius did not encounter in others (Analects 6.3, 11.7). Love of
learning in the Analects does not mean a mere attraction to learning. Human beings
begin learning from birth and probably learned the most things at the greatest speed
without any deliberate effort during the first few years of their lives. This inclination
to learn may fade as one settles into the routine of habits accumulated over time.
However, mere liking for learning cannot be as rare as Confucius made it out to be.
What is rare is the kind of love for learning that means treating learning as a first
priority, putting forth untiring efforts without ceasing, and being prepared to pay a
high price in terms of worldly goods for the sake of that commitment to learning, and
at the same time finding delight in the experience rather than suffering and
bemoaning the price of learning. Those who can be said to have a love of learning ‘do
not look for a full stomach in eating, nor comfort and contentment in their lodgings’
(Analects 1.14). Yan Hui, with his great love for learning, was probably with good
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reason the most impoverished among Confucius’ students, yet poverty had no effect
on his enjoyment of learning and practicing the Confucian way of excellence.
The Master said, ‘A person of character (xian ) is this Yan Hui! He has a bamboo
bowl of rice to eat, a gourd of water to drink, and a dirty little hovel in which to
live. Other people would not be able to endure his hardships, yet for Hui it has no
effect on his enjoyment. A person of character is this Yan Hui! (Analects 6.11)
It is such exceptional love for learning that is rare, and for which Confucius also
prided himself on having.
The Master said, ‘There are, in a town of ten households, bound to be people who
are as good as I am in doing their utmost (zhong ) and in making good on their
word (xin ), but there will be no one who can compare with me in the love of
learning (haoxue).’ (Analects 5.28)
Confucius seemed to value the love of learning above zhong and xin, as the former
appears to be rarer and probably more difficult to attain. This is significant as zhong
and xin are two of the four categories of Confucius’ teachings (Analects 7.25); they
are important virtues of exemplary persons. On one occasion, Confucius
recommended that his students ‘take zhongxin ( ) as their mainstay’
(Analects 1.8). On another occasion, he pointed out that to take zhongxin as one’s
mainstay is ‘to accumulate excellence’ (chongde ) (Analects 12.10). Confucius’
student Master Zeng examined himself thrice everyday with regard to zhong and xin
(Analects 1.4). The same student clarified for others that ‘the one thread that binds
together the Master’s way’ is none other than zhong and shu , ‘doing one’s utmost
and putting oneself in the other’s place’ (Analects 4.15). Yet Confucius prided himself
on the fact that others could match him on zhong and xinmore easily than they could
equal him in the love of learning.
Not only does this imply that virtues of zhong and xin are not as important as the
love of learning, Confucius explicitly explained to Zilu, a man of action and probably
the least fond of learning among Confucius’ students, that virtues, including the
primary Confucian virtue of ren , become flawed in the absence of love of learning.13
The flaw in being fond of acting authoritatively (ren) without equal regard for
learning is that you will be easily duped; the flaw in being fond of acting wisely
(zhia ) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to self-indulgence; the
flaw in being fond of making good on one’s word (xin) without equal regard for
learning is that it leads one into harm’s way; the flaw in being fond of candor
(zhib ) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to rudeness; the flaw in
being fond of boldness (yong ) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to
unruliness; the flaw in being fond of firmness (gang ) without equal regard for
learning is that it leads to rashness. (Analects 17.8)
Besides his love of learning, Confucius is also well known for his love of antiquity
(haogu), although Confucius discussed the former more frequently than the latter
with his students. He compared himself to the ‘venerable Old Peng’ in the confidence
with which he loved antiquity. Confucius linked ‘love of antiquity’ with his love of
learning.
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The Master, ‘I was not born with knowledge but, being fond of antiquity, I was
quick to seek it.’ (Analects 7.20, Lau’s translation)
While those born with knowledge are the most superior, most people acquire
knowledge through learning; Confucius was contemptuous of those who made no
effort to learn even when vexed with difficulties (Analects 16.9). It is ambiguous
whether Confucius sought knowledge about antiquity because of his love for it, or his
love for antiquity enabled him to be quick in seeking knowledge. It is very likely that
both meanings are present. Confucius loved antiquity because he could learn from it;
he loved learning because it connected him to the antiquity which he loved. The love
of learning and the love of antiquity are interdependent and mutually enhancing.
Antiquity represents a rich reservoir of knowledge for Confucius. Many of the
passages mentioning antiquity (gu) are about learning from past examples (Analects
3.16, 4.22 among others).
The tendency to read Confucius as a conservative traditionalist, who is against all
innovation, often leads to the erroneous conclusion that Confucius’ love of learning
is primarily if not exclusively for learning from antiquity. The reading that views
Confucius as a conservative traditionalist finds considerable support in Analects 7.1,
in which Confucius spoke of his love for antiquity after claiming that he ‘transmitted
but did not create (shu er bu zuo )’ (Chan, 1963, p. 31).14 Furthermore,
Confucius often compared contemporary behaviour unfavourably with that of
ancient times, such as observing that, ‘Scholars of old would study for their own sake,
while those of today do so to impress others’ (Analects 14.24, see also 17.16).
Confucius especially admired the cultural achievements of the Zhou dynasty and
claimed to ‘follow Zhou’ (Analects 3.14). Not surprisingly, Confucius has been seen
as someone who looked back towards a lost golden age, and was committed to
restoring the crumbling social and political order of the Zhou dynasty (Graham,
1986, p. 4; Li Zehou, 1996, p. 7).15 This view is compounded historically by
increasingly uncreative and rigidly conservative interpretation and application of the
Master’s teachings once Confucianism became state orthodoxy and Confucius was
elevated to the status of a sage. Learning became reduced to learning from antiquity.
Even when they create new knowledge and understanding, when they innovate,
Confucian scholars traditionally presented their works as learning from the sages of
antiquity, especially Confucius. The traditionalist turn explains the attempts to pass
off one’s work as discovered ‘ancient texts’, and the strength of the commentarial
tradition versus the undervalued claims of original authorship.
Given the historical development of the tradition, it is not surprising that critics of
traditional Confucianism often view Confucian education as rote learning involving
mainly memorizing of obsolete texts, which are out of step with modernization, and
blame it for unthinking devotion to antiquity which stands in the way of progress.
However, I would argue that such traditionalism that stifles creativity and reduces
learning to learning from antiquity is a contingent development based on a biased
reading of the Analects. A close scrutiny of the text, without presupposing that
learning for Confucius is always learning from antiquity, reveals that the love of
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learning is mentioned more frequently than the love of antiquity, and the mentions
of learning refer more often to other (or unspecified) forms of learning than to
learning about or from antiquity. Had Confucius adopted a narrow view of learning
as learning from antiquity, he would be guilty of an inadequate understanding of
learning even for his time. His quest of personal cultivation and bringing about better
government, to realize the way in his world could not be achieved with learning that
is confined to learning from the past. I contend that the evidence in the Analects
shows that Confucius has a much broader understanding of learning that renders it
much more useful to contemporary Confucians.
Pragmatic Experiment in Uniting Love of Learning and Love of Antiquity
The traditionalist conservative reading of Confucius’ teachings turns its back on
Confucius’ love of learning, and fails to appreciate the importance of learning in
acquiring zhia and the pragmatic nature of zhia in the Confucian way.16 Confucius
taught his students the importance of learning from the problems encountered and
not repeating one’s mistakes (Analects 1.8, 9.25, 15.30, 16.9). The unsatisfactory
results of practicing Confucianism as rigid traditionalism and authoritarian political
orthodoxy should encourage modern Confucians to interpret and embody
Confucius’ teachings differently. I shall show that remaining true to Confucius
love of learning while not surrendering his love of antiquity in today’s world requires
a democratic understanding of Confucianism, rather than a revival of conservative
traditionalism. In this democratic understanding, Confucian democracy is a
pragmatic experiment. According to Dewey’s pragmatic conception, democracy is
a way of life that employs the method of organized intelligence in ‘the greatest
experiment of humanity—that of living together in ways in which the life of each of
us is at once profitable in the deepest sense of the word, profitable to himself and
helpful in the building up of the individuality of others’ (Dewey, 1938, p. 303).
I suggest that one such experiment is the Confucian practice of ren, which involves
participating in a community where members ‘establish others in seeking to establish
themselves, and promote others in seeking to get there themselves’ (Analects 6.30).
In Dewey’s pragmatic conception, democracy is a way of life that replaces violence
as a means to settle disagreements and differences in social life with mutual learning
and intelligence in social inquiry. As a Pragmatist, Dewey views all ideas as tools for
solving actual problems human beings encounter; democracy is one such idea.
It solves the problem that Immanuel Kant calls ‘the unsocial sociability of men, that
is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual
resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up’ (Reiss, 1991, p. 45).
Dewey does not share Kant’s conception of human beings as autonomous
individuals; for him, human individuals are social beings (Dewey, 1891, p. 335;
1912–1913).17 However, he would agree with Kant about the inherent tensions of
social life because of the diversity of personalities, beliefs, desires, interests, and so on
among individuals and groups sharing a common space. To successfully share that
Asian Philosophy 151
space without coming to blows, members of a group would need to hold things in
common, that is, they have to become a community, where differences and
disagreements are resolved through communication and intelligence rather than
violence (Dewey, 1939b, p. 228).
Dewey’s substitution of intelligence for reason as the key concept for under-
standing the thinking involved in democratic life is more conducive to Confucian
thought than other democratic theories infected by dualisms of body and mind, of
reason and emotion. Intelligence in Dewey’s philosophy ‘is not the faculty of intellect
honored in textbooks and neglected elsewhere, but which is the sum-total of
impulses, habits, emotions, records, and discoveries which forecast what is desirable
and undesirable in future possibilities, and which contrive ingeniously in behalf of
imagined good’ (Dewey, 1917, p. 48). Of Western models, pragmatic democracy is
most useful to Confucian communities because it is not about universal absolute
ideals that ignore cultural particularities. Pragmatists construct true social ideals by
‘extract[ing] the desirable traits or forms of community life which actually exist, and
employ[ing] them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement’
(Dewey, 1916a, p. 89). Such ideals direct our actions; they are ‘generated through
imagination, but not made out of imaginary stuff’ (Dewey, 1934a, p. 33). As a
pragmatic experiment, Confucian democracy could and would have to develop its
own culturally particular forms of democratic practice by drawing on the actual
experience of Confucian societies including their traditions; it is a pragmatic
democracy in so far as its community life is one that fosters the growth of all
members and employs the method of experimental intelligence in solving the
problems of common life. Its members resolve problems through social inquiry with
free and equal participation, where freedom means ‘the power to secure release and
fulfillment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and manifold
association with others’, and equality ‘the unhampered share which individual
member of the community has in the consequences of associated action’ (Dewey,
1927, p. 329).
A Deweyan would persuade a Confucian to accept pragmatic democracy by
arguing that Confucius’ love of learning could only be satisfied in such a community.
As a pragmatic experiment, democracy is the most educative of community life. It
makes the best use of the resources accumulated in the past for living well in the
present and creating a better future. For Dewey, a democratic community is one that
solves the problems of common life through a process of social inquiry, which aims
to be both educative and intelligent. Democratic life is educative because the ethical
ideal of democracy ‘is not satisfied merely when all men sound the note of harmony
with the highest social good, so be it that they have not worked it out for themselves’
(Dewey, 1888, p. 243). In this insight into the ethical end of human growth,
pragmatic understanding of democratic life chimes in with the Confucian belief that
the building of community requires the embodiment of ren in oneself (Analects 12.1,
14.42) and personal cultivation requires learning by oneself and for oneself in a
community (Analects 14.24).18 The democratic method is that of intelligence because
it uses past experiences to meet new experiences, so as to improve the present and
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shape a better future. The intelligence involved is ‘a pooled and coordinated social
intelligence, not the mere scattered individualized intelligences of persons here and
there, however high their IQs may be’ (Dewey, 1920, p. 134; 1939a, p. 320). Social
intelligence emerges in the give and take of cooperative inquiry, it is a product of
communication among the participants and an embodiment of ‘the rich store of the
accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes’ that the
participants are able to draw upon (Dewey, 1935, pp. 38, 48; 1927, p. 366). Such a
community unites Confucian love of learning and love of antiquity in its way of life.
One should perhaps pause before equating Dewey’s ‘the rich store of accumulated
wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes’ with antiquity. Dewey seldom
mentioned ‘antiquity’ and on a few occasions made disparaging remarks about
education that is based on ‘antiquity’, which in the Western context refers to ancient
Greek and Roman culture. If ‘antiquity’ is perceived as ‘the supposed body of
ready-made knowledge upon which learned men rested in supine acquiescence and
which they recited in parrot-like chorus’ (Dewey, 1920, p. 99), then it becomes an
obstacle to intelligent inquiry. Some traditionalist readings of Confucianism fall into
a similar attitude to Chinese antiquity. However, if we keep in mind that Confucius
admired antiquity because he believed that the world was a better place in those
times, and he wished to learn from antiquity to improve the world he lived in, then
we are not talking about the ‘musty antiquity’ of the scholastics; we would then be
quite justified in seeing the ‘antiquity’ Confucius loved and learned from as the
Chinese equivalent to Dewey’s ‘the rich store of accumulated wealth of mankind in
knowledge, ideas and purposes’, which are instruments for improving the world we
now live in.
Dewey usually associated intelligence with the scientific method. It would be
anachronistic to attribute any concern with scientific knowledge to Confucius. Could
Confucian understanding of learning really accommodate ‘creative intelligence’,
which sums up ‘the pragmatic attitude’? Dewey was not guilty of scientism in the
sense of reducing everything to science, or dismissing anything that lies outside
science.19 By ‘scientific method’ he meant a generalized mode of thinking rather than
specialized techniques. The primary implications of adopting the scientific method in
education is a recognition that we learn from experience, from personally engaging
subject matter in experiments; and experiments do not occur only in science
laboratories but include any activity that systematically connect what we do with
what we undergo, connect actions and their consequences. The understanding of the
connections between events and actions on the one hand, and their consequences in
specific circumstances on the other, enables us to direct future events through
actions, although we can never establish complete control because of the contingency
and uncertainty that pervade human existence in its full complexity. Connecting
events and actions with consequences gives them additional meaning while success in
directing future events for satisfying results, that is, resolving problematic situations,
creates value. For Dewey, education is a reconstruction or reorganization of
experience that achieves meaning and value; the meaning and value of human
experience go beyond science. The ‘accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge,
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ideas and purposes’ he wished to make more accessible to all so that they may
conduct their lives more intelligently and thereby more democratically refers to the
cultural legacies of human achievements in both art and science.20
Instead of affirming the scientistic claim that science is omnipotent, Dewey
lamented that, ‘Modern preoccupation with science and with industry based on
science has been disastrous’ (Dewey, 1926a, p. 112). In promoting the scientific
method, his understanding of science departs radically from the narrowly
rationalistic assumptions that underlie scientism. He insisted that science ‘must be
seen and placed as one mode of human concern and occupation connected both in
source and in outcome, with all other human interests and undertakings.’ For Dewey,
science is ‘the convergence to a focus of human activities that bear the names of art,
politics, law, economics, and even of such things as are sport and recreation’, but it
cannot replace any of these other realms of human achievements (Dewey, 1949,
p. 366). Science cannot even realize its full value in human affairs until we also
recognize the place of art in living a free, full and enriched life. Despite their technical
and specialized differences, science and art are fundamentally united as comple-
mentary phases of human experience, different ways of responding to the need of the
human organism to attain relationships of equilibrium with its environments.
Neither is purely intellectual, cognitive, or affective. They both involve ‘practical
adjustments’ in ‘bringing about a new relationship between organisms and the
conditions of life, and like other phases of the function is controlled by need, desire
and progressive satisfactions’ (Dewey, 1926b, p. 106). Science and art are both
intelligent forms of conduct. Art is not inferior to science in its educative import and
is arguably more fundamental in Dewey’s philosophy of experience.
The doings and sufferings that form experience are, in the degree in which
experience is intelligent or charged with meanings, a union of the precarious, novel,
irregular with the settled, assured and uniform—a union which also defines the
artistic and esthetic. (Dewey, 1925, p. 269)
There is no inherent problem of scientism to prevent Deweyan pragmatic
democracy from being adapted for use by Confucians. There is no unbridgeable gulf
between Dewey’s Pragmatism and Confucianism because intelligent conduct for
Dewey goes beyond science to embrace the rest of humanity’s cultural achievements
while Confucius’ idea of learning is more than just learning about antiquity for its
own sake. On the part of modern Confucians, there is nothing in Confucius’
teachings that requires them to reject science and technology in the role Dewey
assigned these aspects of civilization. Insofar as these could contribute to people’s
general well-being, the Confucian concern with ‘being broadly generous with the
people and being able to help the multitude’ (Analects 6.30) should dispose them
favourably toward science. Confucius’ insistence that one should not be inflexible in
learning provides support for modern Confucians to be open-minded about the
subject-matter of education (Analects 1.8, 9.4, 14.32). Certainly a proposal to
reintroduce the ancient curriculum of the ‘six arts’ (liuyi ) of Confucius’ time is
too impractical to help the cause of a meaningful revival of Confucianism.
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Although there is recently something of a fad in reintroducing classical Chinese texts
to school children in some Asian societies, this is in the form of ‘enrichment’ rather
than replacing the modern education curricula which are heavily biased towards the
sciences. While modern Confucians need to adapt themselves to scientific inquiry,
the bias that Dewey deemed disastrous could perhaps be moderated by the Confucian
tradition of comprehensive aesthetic education, wherein knowledge is very much a
holistic practice, which avoids the divisions of intellectual, affective and practical that
troubled the Western traditions Dewey criticized. The aesthetic element in Confucian
education, clearly highlighted by the emphasis on the joy of learning, the importance
Confucius assigned to the songs (shi ), rites (li ), and music ( ), fits into
Dewey’s pragmatic understanding of learning and knowledge that recognizes both
science and art as intelligent activities.21
For pragmatic democracy to unite Confucian love of learning and love of
antiquity, it is important to recognize that the latter does not limit Confucians to
learning about ancient ideas and practices for their own sake, or slavish imitation of
the ancients. Confucius praised Zigong not for being merely able to quote from the
ancient text, the Songs, but for his understanding which demonstrates that, ‘on the
basis of what has been said, he knew what is yet to come’ (Analects 1.15).
The master said, ‘Reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new (wengu er
zhixin )—such a person can be considered a teacher.’ (Analects 2.11)
Reading zhixin ( ) pragmatically, as this translation does, the passage indicates
that, in learning about antiquity, one connects it to what is new so that one could use
resources from the past to transform the present and shape the future. Such a view of
education exemplifies Dewey’s method of intelligence: the use of past experiences to
meet the needs of new experiences in order to reorganize experience for better
outcomes. If we read zhixin in terms of non-pragmatic epistemology, one might
understand this passage as implying that certain aspects of reality, of what can be
known, remains unchanged, and it is because what is true of the old is still true of the
new that reviewing the old enables one to know the new. However, I contend that
this is a less persuasive reading because if the crux of the matter in learning/teaching
is grasping what remains unchanged, why contrast the old with the new, why not
‘review the past as a means of knowing the present or future’ instead? The contrast
between old and new emphasizes change. The challenge of teaching and, by
implication, of learning as well, is to make what is old serviceable in new situations, a
challenge directly addressed by the pragmatic concept of intelligence (Dewey, 1926c).
A pragmatic reading also fits several other passages in the Analects on zhia and
xue( ). Those who are described as zhia ‘are active’ (Analects 6.23), for knowledge is
not purely intellectual, but is a form of practice. One looks to a person’s practice to
determine if he ‘knows the rites’ (zhili ) (Analects 3.22, 7.31). A person who is
zhia ‘devotes himself to what is appropriate for the people and shows respect for the
ghosts and spirits while keeping them at a distance’ (Analects 6.22). Confucius
responded to a request to explain the meaning of ‘knowing people’ (zhiren )
in terms of the action one should take: ‘Raise the straight and set them over
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the crooked. This can make the crooked straight’ (Analects 12.22, Lau’s translation).
Whether one has learned is determined by practice.
Zixia said: ‘As for persons who care for character much more than beauty, who in
serving their parents are able to exert themselves utterly, who gave their whole
person in the service of their rule, and who, in interactions with colleagues and
friends, make good on their word (xin)—even if it were said of such persons that
they are unschooled, I would insist that they are well educated (xue) indeed.’
(Analects 1.7)
It is not intellectual learning that gives delight, but learning that is practiced at
appropriate times (Analects 1.1). What recommends ‘learning the way’ (xuedao
) to everyone is its practical consequences: ‘Exemplary person who studies the
way love others; petty persons who study the way are easier to employ’ (Analects
17.4).
Confucius’ learning is not confined to the ancient; he also learned from his own
experience and the experience of those around him. He claimed that his knowledge is
based on ‘using his ears (wenb ) widely and following what was good in what he
had heard; and using his eyes (jiana ) widely and retaining what he had seen in his
mind’ (Analects 7.28, Lau’s translation).22 Confucius considered such knowledge
derived from experience of a ‘lower level’, probably in comparison with knowledge
that some have at birth (Analects 16.9). In allowing for the latter, the Analects differs
from Dewey’s pragmatic conception of knowledge, but such non-pragmatic
knowledge is extremely rare and mentioned only in passing; in the text, Confucius
and his students were mostly concerned with knowledge that can be acquired
through learning. Besides direct experience, people with whom one comes into
contact constitute an important source of knowledge. One learned from them by
listening to them, but also by observing and reflecting on their behaviour.
The Master said, ‘In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound
to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and identifying their
weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly.’ (Analects 7.22)
Confucius’ love for antiquity is also pragmatic. He recommended that his students
study ancient works such as the Rites and the Songs not simply because they were
ancient but because of their usefulness. ‘If you do not study the Songs, you will be at a
loss as to what to say . . . If you do not study the Rites, you will be at a loss as to where
to stand’ (Analects 16.13, also 17.9, 17.10).
The Master said, ‘if people can recite all of the three hundred Songs and yet when
given official responsibility, fail to perform effectively, or when sent to distant
quarters, are unable to act on their own initiative, then even though they have
mastered so many of them, what good are they to them?’ (Analects 13.5)
Antiquity provides rich resources for dealing with present problems. In Analects
7.15, Confucius’ student Zigong derived a judgment about a politically sensitive issue
of the time by discussing with Confucius the experience of Bo Yi and Shu Qi, whom
Confucius considered worthy people from the past. This example of ‘reviewing the
old to realize the new’ is also one of pragmatic intelligence using past experience to
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understand the present so that one might resolve a current problematic situation.
Similarly, unless our study of Confucian texts, such as the Analects, enables us to
understand our own current situations and solve contemporary problems, we fail to
emulate Confucius’ love of antiquity.
Confucius’ love of antiquity did not result in slavish imitation or rigid preservation
of ancient practices. Confucius was prepared to adopt some innovations in rites even
as he resisted others (Analects 9.3). He advocated mourning parents for three years
not just because he believed it was the common practice among the ancients, but
because only children who were ‘unfeeling’ (buren ) would fail to do so (Analects
14.40, 17.21). He recommended that, for a state to be viable, it should ‘introduce the
calendar of the Xia dynasty, ride on the large yet plain carriage of Yin, wear the
ceremonial cap of Zhou’, rather than adopt the oldest known practices (Analects
15.11). To Mark Lewis, this means that ‘the Three Dynasties appear not as
demonstrations of political impermanence, nor as exemplary models, but rather as
proofs of the constant adaptation of rites, and as resources to be drawn on’ (Lewis,
1999, p. 109). The culture of Zhou was rich not because it was an exact replica of Xia
or Shang (if so, there would be no reason for Confucius to prefer Zhou to them) but
because ‘looking back (jianb )’ toward the two earlier dynasties, the Zhou achieved
insights that enabled it to create new meanings and values that improved on the
old.23 Confucius cherished antiquity not in the form of what Xu Fuguan called ‘low
order tradition’—concrete and passive inheritance lacking the capacity for self-
criticism and self-transformation (1962, pp. 619–622). What he loved were the
accomplishments of antiquity, the intellectual and spiritual crystallization from
ancient ways of life, which were not a given, but is in a sense also Confucius’ creation
because it resulted from his own unique understanding of antiquity; this unique
understanding reflectively links the past with present and future efficaciously to foster
the growth of experience. Despite his self-assessment, Confucius’ love of antiquity
and the resulting learning are creative.
That Confucius was creative in loving and learning about/from antiquity is not
surprising, since in reviewing the old to realize the new, he displayed pragmatic
intelligence. According to Dewey, ‘intelligence is itself the most promising of all
novelties, the revelation of the meaning of that transformation of past into future
which is the reality of every present’ (Dewey, 1917, p. 47). In practice, the best
Confucians have demonstrated creativity in their understanding, application and
development of Confucianism, just as Confucius himself, in his editing, revising and
‘putting in order’ texts handed down from the past, would have been creative. Such
literary labours may seem to lack the kind of creativity found in what is termed
‘original works’ (which in any case still rely on experience and tradition); nevertheless
they require creative interpretation and critical selection, both of which are informed
by consideration of pragmatic efficacy rooted in actual experience. The latter is the
creativity of pragmatic intelligence, which is not creatio ex nihilo or creation de nouvo,
but creation rooted in experience, linking past, present, and future and therefore
fostering the growth of experience. Such creativity requires materials from the past
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and involves initiation into a tradition as ‘the means by which the powers of learners
are released and directed’ (Dewey, 1926c, p. 57).
The process of teaching and learning exemplified in Confucius’ interactions with
his students is creative. Confucius demanded that his students return with three other
corners after he showed them one corner (Analects 7.8). The ‘one corner’ given is
insufficient to determine the other three without specifying the size of the square:
there are infinite sets of three corners that could be offered as appropriate responses.
While the implicit requirement that the four corners must form a square prevents the
chaos of ‘anything goes’, the ineradicable indeterminacy of the situation leaves more
room for creativity than is usually recognized in the Confucian tradition. Confucius
considered himself inferior to Yan Hui because when the latter heard or learned one
thing, he would know ten (Analects 5.9). This requires making meaningful and
valuable connections between the one thing heard or learned, and the ten things
known. From a pragmatic standpoint, if the connections are not meaningful and
valuable, it would mean that the claims of knowledge are false because the
conceivable consequences of those claims would not be efficacious. There is
pragmatic creativity involved not only in making those connections, both mentally
and practically, but also in recreating in his own way, through these connections, the
initial one thing heard or learned. Such recreating is the creativity manifested ‘in all
forms of life that are not tied down to what is established by custom and convention
. . . [and] brings refreshment, growth, and satisfying joy to one who participates’
(Dewey, 1948, p. 315).
In recreating Confucius’ teachings in democratic ways, in revitalizing
Confucianism as a pragmatic experiment of Confucian democracy, we embody his
love of learning and love antiquity in new ways of life. In understanding democracy
pragmatically, we loosen its ethnocentric shackles so that it might engage in truly free
and equal interactions with traditions other than those in which it first emerges.
Confucian democracy requires more democratic encounters between democracy and
Chinese philosophy. Only through such democratic interactions will democracy take
root in different soils, grow diverse foliage, and bear refreshingly new fruits.
Notes
[1] The New Culture Movement promoted new literature written in the vernacular instead of
archaic Chinese and new thought emphasizing scientific attitudes and independent inquiry,
criticizing traditional Chinese culture and learning from the West. Studies of the May
Fourth Movement usually also discuss the New Culture movement. Some argue that the
New Culture Movement is one of the causes of the May Fourth Movement; some treat them
as synonymous, or one as part of the other; others consider them significantly distinct
(Chow, 1960, pp. 2–3). For examples of writings attacking Confucianism during that period,
see Chen Duxiu (1960); Wu Yu (1922). Hu Shih’s preface to Wu’s collected essays is the
source of the slogan ‘Down with the Confucian Shop’ (dadao Kongjiadian ).
[2] On Chiang Kaishek’s Fascism, see Eastman (1974, chap. 2). Scholars disagree about
how fascist Chiang’s rule was. Cf. Hsia (1979); Eastman (1979); Fewsmith (1985, chap. 7);
Ding Shouhe (1994, pp. 103–111).
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[3] One of the many journals founded in that period was The New Enlightenment. Xu Jilin
singled out 1984 as the beginning of the ‘new Enlightenment’ of the 1980s (1999, p. 254). In
his survey of contemporary Chinese thought, Wang Hui (2001) held up ‘new enlightenment’
thought as the ‘most dynamic intellectual current of the 1980s’.
[4] On rural and urban protest in provinces and local districts, see Unger (2000); Ding Yijiang
(2001, p. 57); Patrick Tyler’s New York Times report on rural poverty which had resulted in
riots in Guizhong in 1994, in Schell and Shambaugh (1999, pp. 357–361). Although the
demonstrations by Falun Gong members in 1999 were impressive in number (nearly ten
thousand members gathered outside Zhongnanhai, the residence of the Chinese leadership
in Beijing), its connection with democracy is at best indirect in highlighting religious
freedom and human rights problems in China. Chinese publications have been mostly pro-
establishment and brand the Falun Gong as a cult with political motives and spreading
pernicious superstitions, although its critics were careful to emphasize dealing with it
according to the law, and the need to raise civic consciousness, scientific and
cultural standards of the people to resist such cults. One Chinese writer even called on
the ‘May Fourth spirit’ to expose and criticize it (Chen Hongxing & Dai Chenjing, 1999;
Wu Wei & He Bingji, 2001, pp. 303–356). For studies in English, see Schechter (2001) and
Ng (2000).
[5] For writings on the humanist spirit debate and ‘academic norms’ debate, see Luo Gang and
Ni Wenjian (2000, pp. 3–161, 317–482).
[6] An example of such a claim is found in Chen Yao-guang (1993, pp. 18–22). The practice of
democracy is included in Chen’s understanding of the modernization process (p. 29).
[7] A few examples of a large body of works, dating back to the early nineties, exploring the
contemporary relevance of Confucianism include Huang Bingtai (1995); Fang Keli (1997);
Wang Weixin (1997); Lu Dusheng (2001); Zeng Jianping and Liu Xiangrong (2002); Tang
Enjia (2002); Lai Ping and Li Lihong (2003); Yang Yun (2003); Hu Jun (2003); Zhang
Zhaoduan (2003).
[8] For examples of Chinese writings on Confucianism and democracy, see Zhu Xueqin (1992);
Liu Xingbang (1994); Cai Baowen (1995); Chen Hanming (1998).
[9] Besides South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, South East Asian countries
in which the Chinese minorities dominate the business sectors—e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand—have also done relatively well. Within the United States, relatively speaking, the
Chinese Americans have also fared better economically than other ethnic groups (Chan,
1993, p. 39).
[10] Articles debating the relation between Confucianism and Modernization of Korea,
Japan and South East Asia have appeared frequently in Chinese journals, for example,
Liu Zhidong (2000); Liao Yiping (2002). Monographs on the topic include Rozman (1991);
Tu Wei-ming (1996); Yu Mingsong (2000); Xu Yuanhe (2002); Liu Shu-hsien & Lin Yuehui
(2002).
[11] At the regional meeting for Asia held in Bangkok in March/April 1993, state representatives
from Asian countries boldly criticized the prevailing conception of universal human rights as
being too Western, and expressed their intention to set their own ‘Asian standards’ for
human rights.
[12] Analects 2.4. Subsequent citations from the Analects giving book and chapter numbers
will be in the text. Translations of the Analects are, occasionally with some modifications,
mostly from Ames and Rosemont (1998). A few translations are cited from other
translations when I feel that Ames and Rosemont’s translation leans too much in
favour of my arguments wishing to avoid taking for granted our shared pragmatic
interpretation.
[13] In Analects 11.25, Zilu questioned the need to learn by reading books and Confucius
reprimanded him for being ‘glib-tongued’ (ning ).
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[14] Other translations of zuo include ‘innovate’, ‘invent’, ‘make up something new’, in
Lau (1979); Leys (1997); Waley (1996). Ames and Rosemont (1998) translate this passage as
‘Following the proper way, I do not forge new paths’.
[15] Cf. Creel (1949, pp. 143–144); Fingarette (1972, p. 60); Ching (1997, pp. 69–74).
[16] The term zhia is translated as wisdom or knowledge (wise, know, knowing, etc.).
While wisdom, especially in the sense of practical wisdom, phronesis, is usually my
preferred translation, I shall henceforth speak in terms of knowledge because this translation
is neutral to my interpretive endeavour in this article and therefore poses the tougher
challenge.
[17] For more detailed accounts of Dewey’s social conception of individuals, see Campbell (1995,
pp. 38–44); Tan (2004b, pp. 22–29).
[18] The key Confucian virtue of ren has been variously translated as benevolence, humanity, and
authoritative conduct. My personal favourite is ‘co-humanity’ suggested by Peter Boodberg
(1953). For a more detailed account of how ren unites community building with
personal growth, see Tan (2004b, pp. 35–39, 82–88). The view that practicing the way
originates in oneself and learning must be for oneself is elaborated in the idea of zide ( ),
‘finding it in oneself’ in the Mencius 4B14 (Lau, 1970, p. 130). Cf. de Bary (1991) picks out
zide as a theme of ‘learning for One’s Self’ that highlights the individual in neo-Confucian
thought.
[19] This question of scientism is particularly important because some scholars considered it a
legacy of Dewey’s influence in China during the May Fourth period (Kwok, 1965, chap. 4;
Lin, 1979, chap. 5). For an argument against a scientistic interpretation of Dewey’s theory of
democracy, see Tan (2004a).
[20] This is one of the meanings of culture that Dewey often referred to (Dewey, 1916b,
p. 198; 1930, p. 99). Although Dewey sometimes further subdivided the ‘culminating
aspects of civilizations’, including philosophy, politics, law, economics, and sports
among the categories of culture, these could be treated as either belonging to science
or art or as a combination of the two, insofar as science and art respectively
comprises the achievements in the instrumental and consummative phases of human
experience. For better understanding of this view of art and science, see Dewey (1925,
1934b).
[21] The Master said, ‘I find inspiration by intoning the songs (shi), I learn where to stand from
observing ritual propriety (li), I find fulfillment in playing music’ (Analects 8.8). On the
aesthetic aspect of ritual education and performance, see Tan (2004c, pp. 61–63). Emphasis
on the aesthetic in contrast to the rationalistic pervades the work of David Hall and Roger
Ames (1987, pp. 131–138), for an explicit discussion of the primacy of aesthetic order in
Confucian worldview.
[22] Confucius also associated xue with seeing ( jiana) and hearing (wenb) in Analects 2.18. Ames
and Rosemont translate wenb as learning. The character, cong , which means both
keenness of hearing and intelligence (as in congming ), has the ‘ear’ radical,
semantically associating intelligence with hearing. Hearing is also associated with sageliness
in the composition of sheng , the character for sage, and in Confucius’ description of his
journey of learning in quest of sagehood (Analects 2.4).
[23] The character jianb is a cognate of another which means ‘mirror, mirroring’ and often has
the meaning of using something acting like a mirror (water, people, besides the usual
metallic mirror) to improve not just physical sight, but more importantly, intellectual and
spiritual insight. An example is the saying quoted in the Shujing, jiugao (Announcement on
Drunkenness), ‘ren wu yu shui jianb, dang yu min jianb’ ( ),
which James Legge translates as ‘Let not men look only into water, let them look into the
glass of other people’ (Legge, 1960, p. 409).
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